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Abstract
We discuss models and data of crowd disasters, crime, terrorism, war and disease
spreading to show that conventional recipes, such as deterrence strategies, are often
not effective and sufficient to contain them. Many common approaches do not provide
a good picture of the actual system behavior, because they neglect feedback loops, in-
stabilities and cascade effects. The complex and often counter-intuitive behavior of
social systems and their macro-level collective dynamics can be better understood by
means of complexity science. We highlight that a suitable system design and man-
agement can help to stop undesirable cascade effects and to enable favorable kinds of
self-organization in the system. In such a way, complexity science can help to save
human lives.
∗Corresponding author.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades complexity science has evolved from purely theoretical contri-
butions towards applications with real-life relevance. In this paper, we will pay par-
ticular attention to the problem of collective dynamics in human populations [1–3].
Topics addressed range from crowd disasters [4] to crime [5, 6], terrorism [7–9],
wars [10–12], and the epidemic spreading of diseases [13, 14]. These fields increas-
ingly include quantitative, realistic, and even predictive models, bringing together
statistical data analysis, modeling efforts, analytical approaches, and laboratory ex-
periments. These advances make the research described in this paper increasingly rel-
evant for real-life situations, creating the opportunity to employ scientific knowledge
to save human lives.
The diverse problems we consider exhibit systemic instabilities in which control
of the macro-level, the collective dynamics, is lost even though there seems to be a
reasonable level of control at the micro-level of individual system components [15].
In traffic flows, for example, researchers have found that “phantom” traffic jams can
occur in the absence of accidents or bottlenecks [16, 17]. Despite the drivers’ best
efforts to prevent traffic jams, they are unavoidable if the vehicle density crosses a
certain threshold [18, 19]. At high densities, small variations in speed are amplified
from one driver to the next, causing a cascade effect. This ends in a situation un-
desirable for all—one in which every driver is stopped. What, then, can be done to
prevent these systemic instabilities? We suggest here that a better scientific under-
standing, based on methods from complexity science, can help. For example, despite
the complexity of traffic patterns [20], they can be described by analytic and predic-
tive models [18]. This has enabled traffic assistance systems based on a distributed
control approach and bottom-up self-organization, which can be used for effective
congestion avoidance [21,22]. Surprisingly, well-designed self-regulation in this case
outperforms classical top down control.
The focus of this paper will be to give an overview of the new scientific under-
standing of crowd disasters, crime, terrorism, wars, and epidemics gained through
a complex systems perspective. We will explain why “linear thinking” and classical
control approaches fail to overcome or mitigate such problems efficiently due to the
non-linear, non-equilibrium and therefore often counter-intuitive nature of these prob-
lems. Furthermore, we outline how complexity science can provide better solutions
to some long-standing problems than conventional approaches. In particular, we will
illustrate how this can contribute to addressing a number of serious issues still plagu-
ing society despite better-than-ever science, measurement opportunities, information
systems, and technology.
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Figure 1: Cumulative number of fatalities for major crowd disasters between 1970 and
2012. The figure shows a general upward trend in both the number of crowd disasters and
the fatalities caused by them.
2 Crowd disasters and how to avoid them
Tragic crowd disasters repeatedly occur despite strict codes and guidelines for the
organization of mass events. In fact, the number of crowd disasters and the overall
number of fatalities are on the rise, probably as a result of the increasing frequency
and size of mass events (see Fig.1). The classical approach to the avoidance of crowd
disasters is reflected in the concept of “crowd control”, which assumes that it is nec-
essary to “make people behave”. The concept bears some resemblance to how police
sometimes handle violent demonstrations and riots. For example, tear gas and police
cordons are used with the intention to gain control over crowds. However, there is
evidence that such measures, which are usually intended to improve the safety of the
crowd, may also unintentionally deteriorate a situation. For example, the use of tear
gas may have played a significant role in the crowd disasters in Lima, Peru (1998),
Durban, South Africa (2000), Lisbon, Portugal (2000), Harare, Zimbabwe (2000),
and Chicago, Illinois (2003) [23].
Our approach in the following is to clarify the cause of crowd disasters and then
to discuss simple rules to improve crowd safety, oriented at giving more control to
the individuals (“empowerment”). This strategy can be best described as creating a
system design (“institutional setting”) enabling all individuals and stakeholders to
make a beneficial contribution to the proper functioning of the system—here mass
events.
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2.1 Crowd turbulence
Crowd disasters are examples of situations in which people are killed by other peo-
ple, even though typically nobody wants to harm anybody. To explain the reasons
for crowd disasters, concepts such as “pushing”, “mass panic”, “stampede”, “crowd
crushes” or “trampling” have often been used. However, such views tend to blame the
visitors of mass events, thereby preventing the proper understanding of crowd disas-
ters and their avoidance in the future. In fact, social order will generally not break
down during crowd disasters [24] and it has been found that extreme events may
lead to an emergent collective identity that will result in increased solidarity with
strangers [25] rather than the opposite.
1. The term “pushing” suggests that people are relentlessly pushing towards their
destination, disregarding the situation of others. However, when the density in
the crowd is very high, even inadvertent body movements will cause physical
interactions with others. The forces transmitted by such involuntary body in-
teractions may add up from one body to the next, thereby causing a situation
where people are unintentionally pushed around in the crowd. This situation is
hard to distinguish from intentional pushing.
2. Fatalities during a crowd disaster are often perceived as the result of a “crowd
crush”, i.e. a situation in which the pressure on human bodies becomes so high
that it causes deadly injuries. Such a situation may arise in the case of a “stam-
pede”, i.e. people desperately rushing into one direction but then facing a bottle-
neck, such that the available space per person is increasingly reduced, until the
density in the crowd becomes life-threatening. For example, the crowd disaster
in Minsk, Belarus (1999), was caused by people fleeing into a subway station
from heavy rain.
3. Another explanation of crowd disasters assumes a “state of (psychological)
panic”, which makes individuals behave in an irrational and relentless way,
such that people are killed. An example of this kind may be the crowd disaster
in Baghdad, Iraq (2005), which was triggered by rumors regarding an imminent
suicide bomber. The assumption of mass panic interprets fatalities in crowd dis-
asters similar to manslaughter by a rioting mob—an interpretation, which may
warrant the use of tear gas or police cordons to control an “outraged crowd”.
In sharp contrast to this, it turns out that many crowd disasters do not result from a
“stampede” or “mass panic” [26]. Prior to 2007, crowd-flow theory generally assumed
a state of equilibrium in the crowd, where each level of crowd density (1/m2) could be
mapped to a corresponding value of the crowd flow (1/m/s). This assumption turned
out to be approximately correct for low-to-medium levels of crowd density. How-
ever, it was later found [27] that at very high density the crowd is driven far from
equilibrium.
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In many cases, fatalities result from a phenomenon called “crowd turbulence”,
which occurs when the density in the crowd is so high that bodies automatically touch
each other. As a result, physical forces are transmitted from one body to another—a
process that is unavoidable under such conditions. These forces may add up and create
force chains that cause sudden subsequent pushes from various directions, which can
usually not be anticipated. Eventually, the individuals are pushed so much that one or
some of them may stumble and fall to the ground. This creates a “hole” in the crowd,
which breaks the balance of forces for the surrounding people: they are pushed from
behind, but not anymore from the front, such that they are either forced to step on
fallen persons (“trampling”) or they will also fall. Due to this domino effect, such
“holes” eventually grow bigger and bigger (a situation that may be coined “black hole
effect”). This explains the phenomenon of piles of people, which are often identified
as the causes of crowd disasters and interpreted as instances of trampling. Under such
conditions, it is extremely difficult for individuals to get back on their feet and people
on the ground eventually die of suffocation.
The occurrence of “crowd turbulence” can be understood and reproduced in com-
puter simulations by means of force-based models. Generally speaking, the behavior
of a pedestrian results from two distinct kinds of mechanisms:
1. The cognitive processes [28] used by a pedestrian during interactions with other
individuals, which apply when people undertake avoidance manoeuvres, choose
an avoidance side, plan a way to their destination, or coordinate their move-
ments with others.
2. The physical pressures resulting from body contacts with neighboring individ-
uals, which apply mostly in situations of overcrowding and are responsible for
the phenomenon of crowd turbulence.
While the first category of interactions can be successfully described by means of
a variety of methods (e.g. social forces, cognitive heuristics, cellular automata), the
second type of interactions necessarily calls for force-based models, as it describes
the result of unintentional movements due to physical pressures exerted by densely
packed bodies.
Therefore, crowd turbulence can be described by means of a contact force ~fi j
exerted by a pedestrian j on another pedestrian i defined as:
~fi j = kg(ri+ r j−di j)~ni j . (1)
Herein,~ni j is the normalized vector pointing from pedestrian j to i, and di j is the
distance between the pedestrians’ centres of mass [29]. The parameter k indicates the
strength of between-body repulsion force. The function g(x) is defined as
g(x) =
{
x if pedestrians i and j are touching each other,
0 otherwise.
(2)
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For simplicity, the projection of the pedestrian’s body on the horizontal plane is repre-
sented by a circle of radius ri =mi/320, where mi represents the mass of pedestrian i.
The physical interaction with a wall W is represented analogously by another contact
force:
~fiW = kg(ri−diW )~niW . (3)
Here diW is the distance to the wall W and ~niW is the direction perpendicular to it.
Therefore, both contact forces ~fi j and ~fiW are nonzero only when the pedestrian i is in
physical contact with a wall or another individual. Under normal walking conditions
(that is, when no body contacts occur), the movement of pedestrians is determined
by strategic and cognitive processes that can be described by means of several dis-
tinct methods such as social forces [30] or cognitive heuristics [28]. Nevertheless,
the method that is used to describe the free movements of pedestrians has little ef-
fect on the dynamics that emerge at extreme densities, since pedestrians movements
are mostly unintentional in situations of overcrowding. Describing such situations we
may thus use a generic component ~f 0i describing how the pedestrian i would move un-
der normal walking conditions. The resulting acceleration equation in this case then
reads
d~vi/dt = ~f 0i +∑
j
~fi j/mi+∑
W
~fiW/mi , (4)
where~vi denotes the speed of pedestrian i, where the component ~f 0i is negligible under
extremely crowded conditions. The acceleration equation can be solved together with
the usual equation of motion
d~xi/dt =~vi , (5)
where~xi denotes the location of pedestrian i at time t.
Computer simulations of the above model in crowded situations, where physical
interactions dominate over intentional movements, give rise to global breakdowns of
coordination, where strongly fluctuating and uncontrollable patterns of motion occur.
Crowd turbulence is particularly likely around bottlenecks, where local increases of
the pedestrian density enhance the propagation of physical pressures from one indi-
vidual to another. In particular, the unbalanced pressure distribution results in sudden
stress releases and earthquake-like mass displacements of many pedestrians in all pos-
sible directions, which is well approximated by a power law with an exponent of 1.95
(see Fig. 2). This result is in good agreement with empirical observations of crowd
turbulence, which exhibit a power law distribution with exponent 2.01 [27].
2.2 Simple rules for safety
Preparing for mass events is a major challenge, as there is a host of things that can
go wrong over the course of an event (for a recent example see Ref. [26]). Therefore,
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Figure 2: Result of computer simulations of the above model indicating a power law dis-
tribution of displacements at extreme density. The displacement of a pedestrian i is the
change of location of that individual between two subsequent stops where the speed of i
is less than 0.05 m/s. Simulations were conducted at a density of 6 pedestrians per m2,
corresponding to a unidirectional flow of 360 pedestrians in a corridor of length 10m and
width 6m with a bottleneck of width 4m. Model parameters were set to k = 5 ·103 and the
body masses mi were uniformly distributed in the interval [60kg,100kg].
the overall strategy is to develop and implement a suitable system design, which can
be well operated under normal, but also challenging conditions. This includes insti-
tutional settings (e.g. spatial boundary conditions) and the way interactions between
different stakeholders are organized. All elements of the plan, should be exercised
before, including contingency plans. In case of the reorganization of the annual pil-
grimage in Saudi-Arabia (“Hajj”), for example, many elements were combined to
increase the level of safety. This included [32]:
1. advance information,
2. good signage,
3. reliable communication,
4. a control tower jointly used by all responsible authorities,
5. a new Jamarat Bridge design (with separate ramps for pilgrims coming from
and going to different areas),
6. a unidirectional flow organization,
7. a combined routing concept and scheduling program,
8. a real-time flow monitoring,
9. a re-routing in situations of high capacity utilization of certain routes,
10. contingency plans for all kinds of situations (including bad weather conditions).
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It is important to consider that the organization of a mass event must also always
take into account the natural (physical, physiological, psychological, social and eco-
nomic) needs of humans, such as sufficient space, water, food, toilet facilities, per-
ceived progress towards the goal, feeling of safety, information, communication, etc.
Neglecting such factors can promote crowd disasters, in particular, if several short-
comings come together.
While sophisticated procedures combining expert consulting, computer simula-
tions and video monitoring remain the safest way to avoid accidents, most event or-
ganizers are not in a position to undertake them all. In fact, such complex procedures
are often expensive and turn out to be cost-effective only for large events, or if mass
events are regularly held at the same place (e.g. the Muslim pilgrimage in Mecca).
Hence, organizers of small- and intermediate-size events are often constrained to rely
on their intuition and past experience to assess the safety of the events they are in
charge of. However, the dynamics of crowd behavior is complex and often counter-
intuitive. A systemic failure is usually not the result of one single, well-identifiable
factor. Instead, it is the interaction between many factors that cause a situation to get
out of control, while each factor alone does not necessarily constitute the source of
disaster per se [26].
The following paragraphs offer some simple rules that can help one to improve
the safety of mass events. These rules should not be considered as replacement of
existing regulations, but can nevertheless complement more sophisticated procedures,
and are easy to apply for all types of crowding, ranging from large mass events to daily
commuting at train stations and airports.
2.2.1 Design of the environment
When mass events are planned, one simple rule to keep in mind is that counter-flows,
merging flows, and crossing flows generate frictional effects and coordination prob-
lems among neighboring people, which create local peaks of density that increase
the likelihood of congestion. Even though this is a well-established fact in academic
circles, it remains a frequent source of crowd disasters [26]. Likewise, the topology
of the environment plays a crucial role to ensure a smooth flow of people. Avoiding
bottlenecks is probably the most important recommendation. The problems implied
by bottlenecks have been demonstrated with many computer simulations, regardless
of the underlying model [28, 29, 33]. Bottlenecks exacerbate the physical pressure
among neighboring individuals, and create the initial perturbations that might trigger
crowd turbulence. Furthermore, bottlenecks produce long queues and excessive wait-
ing times. Therefore, while people naturally keep reasonable distances between each
other, they tend to become impatient and reduce inter-individual distances when their
perceived progress towards the goal is too slow. This causes a vicious circle: The in-
creasing local density reduces the flow through the bottleneck, and the reduced flow
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further increases the local density. Importantly, bottlenecks do not only result from
the static environment, but can also be created dynamically by other external factors.
Ambulances, police cars, people sitting on the ground, lost belongings, or temporary
fences often create bottleneck situations that were not initially foreseen. Another less
intuitive side-effect is that the temporary widening of pathways can be dangerous as
well, because people typically make use of the additional space to overtake those who
walk in front of them. This creates bottleneck situations when the pathway narrows
again to its normal width. Finally, recent computer simulations have revealed that
sharp turns increase the physical pressure around the inner edge of the bend [28].
Even though turnings are not necessarily dangerous, they constitute potential zones
of danger in case of unexpected overcrowding.
2.2.2 Early detection of problems
When crowd turbulence begins, the situation typically quickly gets out of control.
Detecting this danger early enough is crucial, but remains a challenge. Clear signs of
emergency, such as people falling or calling for help usually happen at a stage that is
already critical and does not enable a timely response. The most accurate indicator of
danger is the local density level. Recent studies have revealed the existence of local
density thresholds above which the danger to the crowd is significantly increased [28]:
Stop-and-go waves tend to emerge beyond 2-4 people/m2, while crowd turbulence is
likely to occur above 4-7 people/m2, depending on the average body diameter. The
problem is that local densities are hard to measure without a proper monitoring sys-
tem, which is not available at many mass events. Nevertheless, crowd managers can
make use of simple signs as a proxy for local density. For example, one may observe
the frequency and strength of body contacts among neighboring people. Typically,
when the frequency of involuntary body contacts increases - often perceived as pushy
behavior - this indicates that pressure in the crowd builds up and pressure relief strate-
gies are needed. Crowd managers should also be alerted by the emergence of stop-
and-go-waves, a self-organized phenomenon characterized by alternating moving and
stopping phases, which is visible to the naked eye [27,28]. As this stop-and-go pattern
is related with a reduced flow of people, the density may quickly increase due to the
vicious circle effect described in the previous section, so that measures for pressure
relief must be taken. Finally, behaviors such as people climbing walls, overcoming
fences, or disrespecting conventional routes - often interpreted as relentless and ag-
gressive behaviors - may indicate escape attempts. They should be considered as a
serious warning signal of a possible, upcoming crowd disaster.
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2.2.3 Information flows and communication
Another major element in minimizing the risk of accidents is to set up an efficient
communication system. A reliable flow of information between the visitors of an
event, the organizers, security staff, police and ambulance is crucial for coordination.
In fact, visitors often become aware of developing congestion too late because of the
short-range visibility in crowded areas. This may impair orientation, which further
increases the problems in the critical zone. In such situations, calm but clear loud
speaker announcements informing visitors and well visible, variable message signs
can let people know why they have to wait and what they should do. A robust com-
munication system often constitutes the last means to gain control before a situation
gets out of hand. It is also important that crowd managers have a reliable overview
of the situation. Existing technologies offer useful monitoring systems that allow for
real-time measurements of density levels and predictions of future crowd movements
(also see section 2.3 describing the use of smartphone applications for inferring crowd
density). While such sophisticated monitoring systems are among the most efficient
ways to keep track of the situation, most events are not yet using them. The minimum
necessary requirement, however, is video monitoring covering the relevant zones of
the event, from which the organizers can precisely evaluate the crowd movements and
detect signs of upcoming congestion.
2.3 Apps for saving lives
Pre-routing strategies are an important element of crowd management as well. For
this, a well-functioning information and communication system is crucial. While clas-
sically, the situation in the crowd is observed by means of surveillance cameras, heli-
copters or drones, and local police forces, there is an array of crowd sensors available
today, based on video, WiFi, GPS, and mobile tracking. Smartphones, in particular,
offer a new way of collecting information about crowded areas and of providing ad-
vice to attendees of mass events.
Advances in microelectronics have resulted in modern mobile phones that offer
significant processing power, sensing capabilities, and communication features. In
combination with a large market penetration they provide an excellent instrument for
crowd monitoring. In particular, data can be acquired by deploying a mobile applica-
tion that probes relevant modalities, e.g. the GPS or acceleration sensors. Adopting
a participatory sensing scheme, macroscopic crowd parameters (e.g. density), meso-
scopic parameters (e.g., collective behavior recognition, group detection, lane and
queue detection, onset of panic prediction) and microscopic parameters of single in-
dividuals (e.g., modes of locomotion, velocity and direction, gestures) can be inferred.
In safety critical and crowded environments such as major sports or religious
events, instrumenting the environment with static sensors based on video or infrared
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Figure 3: Live view of crowd densities in the command and control center of the City
Police Zu¨rich.
Figure 4: Example of a festival site for the case of the “Zu¨rifa¨scht” in Zu¨rich, Switzerland,
showing the perimeter (red) and the stage layout. The main train transportation hubs are
indicated by green circles.
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cameras is currently the most reliable way to obtain a near 100% sample of the crowd
at a sub-second and sub-meter resolution required to accurately measure crowd pres-
sure. However, smartphone apps can be used to infer a good approximation of crowd
behavior at large scales, and can be used to pro-actively intervene before crowds reach
critically high density levels.
From a safety perspective, employing apps for large-scale events has at least three
major advantages:
1. Broadband-communication allows to capture, transmit and centrally process
data in near real-time and to extract and visualize relevant crowd parameters
in a command and control center (Figure 3).
2. Offering bi-directional communication, safety personnel can send notifications,
warnings, or even guide the user in case of an emergency situation. Incorpo-
rating the user’s localization, geo-located messages increase the relevance for
each user, helping to follow rules such as those outlined in section 2.2 [34].
3. Data, once collected, can be used to “replay” the event. The post hoc analysis
is a critical step in the organization of an event and can reveal critical factors
that should be addressed for future events. Although today a great deal of data
is available for such analyses, event organisers and crowd managers are some-
times forced to manually scan through video material, reports from security
services in the field, or feedback from individual visitors. Combining such het-
erogeneous sources is a tedious and error-prone task, thus making it difficult
to reach a reliable assessment and situational awareness. Localizing users via
smartphones potentially offers a mored accurate assessment and allows to cap-
ture crowd dynamics by aggregation.
The use of smart phones for crowd monitoring is a very recent development. Differ-
ent modalities such as bluetooth sensing [35, 36] or app-based GPS localization [37]
have been used to capture collective dynamics such as flocking, crowd turbulence or
mobility patterns patterns during large-scale events. In particular, individual location
data can be aggregated using non-parametric probability density functions [37, 38]
to estimate safety-relevant characteristics such as crowd movement velocity, density,
turbulence or crowd pressure.
Here, we demonstrate the potential of location-data obtained from mobile phones
during the Zu¨ri Fa¨scht festival 2013 in Switzerland (see Fig. 4). The Zu¨ri Fa¨scht
is a three-days event comprising an extensive program with concerts, dance par-
ties, and shows. It is hosted in the city center of Zu¨rich and is the biggest festival
in Switzerland. Up to 2 million visitors have been estimated to attend the festival
over the course of three days. In 2013, 56,000 visitors downloaded the festival app,
from which 28,000 gave informed consent to anonymously contributed their location
data. Figure 5 shows the number of users simultaneously contributing their location
12
Figure 5: Users and samples collected for 15 minute windows.
data over the course of the event, and the amount of data samples collected. While
collecting only a subsample from the entire crowd, previous work [37] showed a cor-
relation coefficient greater than 0.8 between the estimated density and actual density
determined from video recordings.
The time-dependent density of visitors derived from the app data is shown in Fig-
ure 6. The velocity of festival visitors is represented in Figure 7 and the movement
direction in Figure 8. Together the three figures reflect the collective crowd dynam-
ics. While Figure 6 shows spectator densities for multiple events at different times,
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the mobility of the crowd before, during, and after the fire-
works show at lake Zu¨rich. Mobility patterns can be clearly identified. For instance, a
strong northbound flow of the crowd can be observed before the event. Interestingly,
lanes appear with a right-handed pedestrian traffic (highlighted box), which improves
mobility. To support such kind of self-regulation, street signs (e.g., walking direction
arrows) have been employed at other places, for instance at obstacles dividing the
pathway.
Several reality mining projects have demonstrated that it is not only possible to
sense collective behaviors with mobile devices, but also to offer real-time feedback to
the users via a return channel of the app. This allows crowd control staff to actively
moderate the changes in the collective behavior. For example, the safety personnel
may advise visitors to avoid crowded areas and suggest alternative routes. Such mea-
sures thus help improve the safety of crowds considerably.
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Figure 6: Pedestrian densities during the Zu¨rifa¨scht festival for multiple attractions (the
opening ceremony, a high diving competition, a concert, a high wire performance) at dif-
ferent times and locations.
Figure 7: Color-coded pedestrian speed before (left) during (middle) and after (right) the
fireworks show.
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Figure 8: Color-coded pedestrian direction before (left) during (middle) and after (right)
the fireworks show.
3 Crime, Terrorism, and War
The quantitative study of crime and of violent conflict—both within and between
nations—has a long tradition in the social sciences. With the growing availability of
detailed empirical data in recent years, these topics have increasingly attracted the
attention of the complexity science community. The strive to statistically characterize
such data is not new—Richardson’s seminal work on the size of inter-state wars, for
example, dates back to 1948 [39]. Recently, however, large datasets on both crime
and conflict, often providing detailed information on each incident, its location and
timing, have increasingly become available.1 Such data has allowed the kind of statis-
tical, system-level analysis we provide here to shed new light on a number of mech-
anisms underlying global crime and conflict patterns. The combined focus on crime
and conflict in this section is intentional as both may be seen as breakdowns of social
order, albeit of very different scale and arguably with very different origins.
1Detailed crime statistics world-wide are now often routinely released by the regional or national au-
thorities that collect them. Large scale conflict data sets are usually collected and maintained by universities
or research centers.
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3.1 Fighting crime cycles: The cyclic re-emergence of crime
and how to prevent it
Crowd disasters are rare, but may kill hundreds of people at a time. In contrast to this,
crimes are committed many times each day but usually involve only a few people
in every incident. However, the impact of crime adds up and is considerable. In the
US, for example, over 12,700 people were murdered in 2012 [40]. Economically,
cybercrime, for example, results in hundreds of billions of dollars of damage world-
wide every year.
To contain criminal activities, societies resort to various mechanisms punishing
behavior that deviates from generally accepted norms in intolerable and destructive
ways. The percentage of the population imprisoned in a country is an indication for
the severity of state punishment (see Fig. 9A). Remarkably, the US has the highest
incarceration rate in the world [41].2 Nevertheless, its crime rates remain very high
by international comparison and are much higher than in many other industrialized
countries [43].3 In particular, in connection with the “war on drugs”, apparently more
than 45 million arrests were made, yet it was recently declared a failure. In fact,
US Attorney General Eric Holder concluded: “Too many Americans go to too many
prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason.” [45].
But why do crime deterrence measures fail? According to standard rational choice
theories of crime, they should not. The economic model of crime assumes that crim-
inals are utility maximizers who optimize their payoffs pi under restrictions and
risk [46]. There are gains g > 0 (either material or physical or both) to be made
with little effort, but there is also the threat of being sanctioned with a punishment
fine f > 0. If s is the probability for an individual to commit a crime, and p is the
probability for the criminal act to be detected, the payoff is
pi = s(g− p f ) . (6)
It is clear from Eq.( 6) that, at a given detection rate p, higher punishment (larger f )
should reduce crime. However, this simple argument clearly neglects strategic inter-
action and numerous socio-economic factors, all of which play a crucial role in the
evolution of criminal activity.
In reality, increasing levels of deterrence do not necessarily reduce the level of
crime. Instead, one often finds crime cycles. The homicide rate in the United States,
2Since the beginning of the privatization of the the US prison services in the 1970s the number of
prisoners in the US has increased 8-fold from about 300,000 to 2.4 million (US Bureau of Justice Statistics,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=5, accessed April 16, 2014). In international comparison this
implies that with only a twentieth of the world population, the US accounts for a quarter of the world wide
prison population [42].
3It is also interesting to note that a single prisoner annually costs more than the pay of a postdoctoral
researcher. For a recent study on US prison costs per inmate see [44].
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Figure 9: (A) Empirical data on the imprisoned population world-wide (the full list of
countries if available upon request). (B) number of homicides and (C) violent crimes in the
US per 100,000 population. In addition to the average for the US (cyan), panels (B) and (C)
show averages of US States with very high (black), high (red), moderate (green) and low
(blue) crime rates. The four categories are obtained through grouping US States by their
average crime rate over the period 1965-2010 and then assigning the 25% most affected
States to the first category, the 25% next most affected States to the second category, etc.
Examples of US States with very high crime rates are Washington D.C. and New York.
States with low crime rates are, for instance, North Dakota and Utah.
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for example, began to rise steadily in the 1960s and oscillated at around 8 to 10 homi-
cides per 100,000 for 20 years. It only started to significantly decline in the early
1990s (see Fig. 9B). In fact, such fluctuations in the frequency of crime are visible
across a wide and diverse spectrum of criminal offenses, suggesting that cyclic recur-
rence is a fundamental characteristic of crime (see Fig. 9C). This observation is no-
table, in particular, as different criminal offenses—homicide and theft, for example—
are thought to arise from different kinds of motivations: homicides are usually as-
sumed to be related to manifestations of aggression, whereas theft is most often eco-
nomically motivated [47].
Criminological research has identified a number of factors that influence the recur-
rence of crime, its trends and variation across regions and countries. Beside structural
factors, such as unemployment [48, 49] and economic deprivation [50], a number of
studies have highlighted the influence of demography [51], youth culture [52,53], so-
cial institutions [54] and urban development [55]. Others have pointed to the influence
of political legitimacy [50], law enforcement strategies [56,57], and the criminal jus-
tice system [51]. Some recent studies in criminology, in fact, argue that trends in the
levels of crime may be best understood as arising from a complex interplay of such
factors [55,58]. Very recent empirical work has further shown that social networks of
criminals have a distinct impact on the occurrence of crime [59,60], thus highlighting
the complex interdependence of crime and its social context.
Despite these advances the situation for policy makers to date remains rather
opaque, since fully satisfactory explanations for the recurrence of crime are still lack-
ing. Few studies fully recognize the complex interaction of crime and its sanction-
ing [5, 6,61,62]. Analyzing this relationship, however, is of critical importance when
trying to explain why, contrary to expectations [46], increased punishment fines do
not necessarily reduce crime rates [63]. To understand its social context, crime should
be considered as a social dilemma situation: it would be favorable for all if nobody
committed a crime, but there are individual incentives to do so. As a consequence
crime may spread, thereby creating “tragedies of the commons” [64]. Large-scale
corruption and tax evasion in some troubled countries or mafia and drug wars are
examples of this.
If nobody is watching, criminal behavior (such as stealing) may seem rational to
the individual, since it promises a considerable reward for little effort. To suppress
crime it seems plausible to alter the decision situation formalized in Eq.( 7) such that
the probability p of catching a criminal times the imposed fine f eliminates the reward
g of the crime, i.e.
g− p f < 0 . (7)
According to this, whether it is favorable or not to commit a crime critically depends
both on the fine f and on the probability of catching a criminal p. Note that in particu-
lar the non-trivial interdependence of crime and the resources invested into detecting
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and punishing it should strongly affect the resulting spatio-temporal dynamics.
In the simple, evolutionary game-theoretical model we discuss next,4 the proba-
bility of detecting criminal activities is explicitly related to the inspection effort in-
vested by the authorities. The game is played between “criminals” (sx =C), punishing
“inspectors” (sx = P), and “ordinary individuals” (sx = O) neither committing crimes
nor participating in inspection activities. Each player tends to imitate the strategy of
the best performing neighbor.5 The game is staged on a L×L square lattice with pe-
riodic boundary conditions, where individuals play the game with their k = 4 nearest
neighbors. Criminals, when facing ordinary individuals, make the gain g ≥ 0. When
facing inspectors, however, criminals obtain the payoff g− f , where f ≥ 0 is the pun-
ishment fine. If faced with each other, none of two interacting criminals obtains a
benefit. Ordinary people receive no payoffs when encountering inspectors or other
ordinary individuals. Only when faced with criminals, they suffer the consequences
of crime in form of a negative payoff −g ≤ 0. Inspectors, on the other hand, always
bear the cost of inspection, c≥ 0, but when catching a criminal, an inspector receives
a reward r ≥ 0, i.e. the related payoff is r− c. The introduction of dimensionless
parameters is possible in the form of “(relative) inspection costs” α = c/ f , the “(rel-
ative) temptation” β = g/ f , and the “(relative) inspection incentive” γ = r/ f , which
leads to the following payoffs:
piO = −βNC, (8)
piP = γNC−α, (9)
piC = βNO+(β −1)NP, (10)
Herein, NO, NP, and NC are the numbers of ordinary individuals, inspectors and crim-
inals among the k = 4 nearest neighbors. Monte Carlo simulations are performed as
described in the Methods section of Ref. [6].
The collective spatio-temporal dynamics of this simple spatial inspection game is
complex and counter-intuitive, capturing the essence of the crime-fighting problem
well. One can observe various phase transitions between different kinds of collective
outcomes, as demonstrated in Fig. 10. The phase transitions are either continuous
(solid lines in Fig. 10) or discontinuous (dashed lines in Fig. 10), and this differs
markedly from what would be expected according to the rational choice equation (7)
or the well-mixed model [65], namely due to the significant effects of inspection and
spatial interactions. Four different situations can be distinguished:
1. dominance of criminals for high temptation β and high inspection costs α ,
4The game discussed here was originally presented in Ref. [6]. Please refer to the original publication
for further details.
5The imitation probability for two players x and y is given as q = (1+ exp[(Py−Px)/K])−1, where Px
and Py are the payoffs of the players and K sets the intensity of selection.
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Figure 10: Phase diagrams, demonstrating the spontaneous emergence and stability of the
recurrent nature of crime and other possible outcomes of the competition of criminals (C),
ordinary individuals (O) and punishing inspectors (P). The diagrams show the strategies
remaining on the square lattice after sufficiently long relaxation times as a function of the
(relative) inspection costs α and the (relative) temptation β , (A) for inspection incentive
γ = 0.5 and (B) for γ = 1.0. The overlayed color intensity represents the crime rate, i.e.
the average density of criminals in the system. (Figure adapted from Ref. [6]).
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2. coexistence of criminals and punishing inspectors (P+C phase) for large values
of temptation β and moderate inspection costs α ,
3. dominance of police for moderate inspection costs α and low values of temp-
tation β , but only if the inspection incentives γ are moderate [see panel (A)],
and
4. cyclical dominance for small inspection costs α and small temptation
β , where criminals outperform ordinary individuals, while these outper-
form punishing inspectors, and those win against the criminals (C +O+ P
phase) (supplementary videos of different routes towards the emergence of
the cyclic phase are available at youtube.com/watch?v=pH9l-2h6PRo and
youtube.com/watch?v=gVnCN3a9ki8).
Figure 11 provides a more detailed quantitative analysis, displaying in panel (A)
the sudden first-order phase transitions from the C+O+P phase to the pure P phase,
and from this pure P phase to the pure C phase, as inspection costs α increase. In panel
(B), we also observe a sudden, discontinuous phase transition, emerging as neighbor-
ing individuals are rewired. This introduces a small-world effect. We observe that
conflicts escalate in amplitude until an absorbing phase is reached. It follows that the
exact impact of each specific parameter variation depends strongly on the location
within the phase diagram, i.e. the exact parameter combination. General statements
such as “increasing the fine reduces criminal activity” tend to be wrong, which contra-
dicts the widely established point of view. This may explain why empirical evidence
is not in agreement with common theoretical expectations, and it also means we need
to reconsider the traditional perspective on crime.
The model reviewed here, therefore, demonstrates that that “linear thinking” is
inadequate as a means to devise successful crime prevention policies. The level of
complexity governing criminal activities in competition with sanctioning efforts ap-
pears to be much greater than often assumed so far. Our results also reveal that crime
is likely to be recurrent when there is a gain associated with criminal activity. While
our model is, of course, stylized, it can nonetheless help to shed light on the coun-
terintuitive impact of punishment on the occurrence and, in particular, recurrence of
crime.
Our model also highlights that crime may not primarily be the result of activities
of individual criminals. It should be rather viewed as result of social interactions of
people with different behaviors and the collective dynamics resulting from imitative
interactions [59, 60]. In other words, the emergence of crime may not be well un-
derstood by just assuming a “criminal nature” of particular individuals—this picture
probably applies just to a small fraction of people committing crimes. In fact, criminal
behavior in many cases is opportunity-driven or arises as a result of social interactions
that get out of hand. This suggests that changing social context and conditions may
make a significant contribution to the reduction of crime, which in turn has relevant
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Figure 11: A representative cross-section of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 10A (A),
and the robustness of crime cycles against the variation of network topology (B). These
results invalidate straightforward gain-loss principles (“linear thinking”) as proper descrip-
tion of the relationship between crime, inspection, and punishment rates. (A) For β = 0.2
and γ = 0.5, increasing α initially leaves the stationary densities of strategies almost un-
affected, while subsequently two discontinuous first-order phase transition occur. (B) The
social interaction networks were constructed by rewiring links of a square lattice of size
400×400 with probability λ . As λ increases, due to the increasing interconnectedness of
the players, the amplitude of oscillations become comparable to the system size. A sup-
plementary video is available at youtube.com/watch?v=oGNOmLognOY. (Figure adapted
from Ref. [6]).
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implications for policies and law.
It is commonly assumed that we have come a long way in deterring crime. Many
different types of crime are punished all over the world based on widely accepted
moral norms, and there exist institutions, organizations, and individuals who do their
utmost to enforce these norms. However, specific deterrence strategies may some-
times have no, or even unintended, adverse effects. Recent research finds, for exam-
ple, that even though video surveillance usually allows for a faster identification of
criminal delinquents, it rarely leads to a significant decrease in criminal activities in
the surveyed area [66]. In fact, it does not always lead to an increased individual
perception of safety [67], even though this is a key arguments for its widespread use.
Other recent findings suggest that certain police strategies might even be outright
counter-productive. Based on the assumption that removing the leader of a crimi-
nal organization will disrupt its social network, police often attempt to identify and
arrest him or her. A recent study analyzing cannabis producer networks in the Nether-
lands, however, shows that this strategy may be fundamentally flawed: all network
disruption strategies analyzed in the study did not disrupt the network at all or, worse,
increased the efficiency of the network through efficient network recovery [68].
These examples clearly highlight that an insufficient understanding of the com-
plex dynamical interactions underlying criminal activities may cause strong adverse
effects of well-intended deterrence strategies. A new way of thinking, maybe even a
new kind of science for deterring crime is thus sorely needed—in particular one that
takes into account not just the obvious and similarly linear relations between various
factors, but one that also looks particularly at the interdependence and interactions
of each individual and its social environment. One then finds that this gives rise to
strongly counter-intuitive results that can only be understood as the outcome of emer-
gent, collective dynamics. This is why complexity science can make important and
substantial contributions to the understanding and containment of crime.
3.2 Dynamics of terrorism and insurgent conflict
The past decade has seen a resurgence of international terrorism and several vi-
olent civil conflicts. The insurgencies that followed the US-lead interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq have caused civilian casualties in the order of hundreds of thou-
sands while the US-declared “war on terror” has not significantly curbed international
terrorist activity (Fig.12). In fact, in the political arena, critics argue that international
interventions may themselves serve as triggers for terrorist attacks while others sug-
gest the exact opposite, i.e. that only the decisive interventions and aggressive mea-
sures against terrorist organizations have stopped a much more severe escalation of
international terrorism.
There are no studies to date that can convincingly support either of the above
views and establish a clear causal relationship between international terrorist activi-
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Figure 12: International terrorism disaggregated by region. (A) number of events and (B)
fatalities per year. The data were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
(http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) and represent incidents clearly identified as terrorist at-
tacks that lead to at least one fatality.
ties and the “war on terror”. At the level of individual conflicts, however, there are a
number of studies that have helped to clarify the link between interventions and levels
of violence [69–72]. These studies in particular emphasize reactive or “tit-for-tat” dy-
namics as a fundamental endogenous mechanism responsible for both escalation and
de-escalation of conflict. In the context of Iraq, one can find such reactive dynamics
for both insurgent and coalition forces [70, 71]. Other research has identified simi-
lar dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where both the Israeli and Palestinian
side were found to significantly react to violent attacks of the opposing side [73, 74].
Establishing the (causal) effect of actions by one conflict party on the reactions of
the other faction(s) thus appears central to a systemic understanding of endogenous
conflict processes.
There is complementary statistical evidence pointing to relatively simple rela-
tionships underlying aggregate conflict patterns. Empirical data of insurgent attacks,
for example, exhibits heavy tailed severity distributions and bursty temporal dy-
namics [7, 8]. The complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of event
severities is usually found to follow a power law (see Fig. 13):
Pr(X ≥ x)∼ xα , x≥ x0 (11)
where x0 is the lower bound for the power law behavior with exponent α . Note that
such statistical regularities can, for example, be used to estimate the future probabil-
ity of large terrorist events [75]. Bursty temporal dynamics may be characterized by
considering the distribution of inter-event times, i.e the length of the time intervals
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between subsequent events. In a structureless dataset, that is in a dataset where the
timing of events is statistically independent, the CCDF of inter-event times simply
follows an exponential distribution. The deviation of timing signatures from an expo-
nential shape—for example log-normal or stretch exponential signatures—thus points
to significant correlations between the timing of subsequent events.6 Researchers
have offered competing explanations for these system-level statistical regularities.
The power laws in the severity of attacks, for example, have been linked to competi-
tion of insurgent groups and security forces for control of the state [7], but also to a
positive feedback loop between the size and experience of terrorist organizations or
insurgent groups and the frequency with which they commit attacks [76].
It is important to note that the choice of spatial and temporal units of analysis in
such aggregate, system-level analysis may strongly affect results. Choosing empiri-
cally motivated and sufficiently small spatial units of analysis avoids problems arising
from considering time series of potentially unrelated or only very weakly related in-
cidents. In the context of Iraq, for example, the violence dynamics in the Kurdish
dominated North are generally quite different from those in Baghdad or the Sunni
triangle. The same applies to the selection of suitable time periods, in which the same
conflict mechanisms produce aggregate patterns. In fact, the non-parametric analy-
sis of event timing signatures rests on the assumption that the conflict dynamics in
the period analyzed are (approximately) stationary [8]. Timing analyses are there-
fore usually performed for shorter time intervals—for example 6 months—where the
overall intensity of conflict does not significantly change (see Fig. 13).
While such statistical signatures point to similarities in conflict patterns across
cases and help identify general conflict mechanisms, detailed case studies on the
micro-dynamics of violence suggest that mechanisms at the group- or individual-level
may be very conflict- and context-specific [79]. A number of micro-level mechanisms
that all contribute to the aggregate violence patterns are likely to be present in many
conflicts (see, for example Ref. [80]). The effect of (local) contact between warring
factions on levels of violence, for instance, has been of central interest in conflict
studies. Examining violence in Jerusalem between 2001 and 2009, a recent study ad-
dresses this question using an innovative combination of formal computational mod-
eling and rich, spatially disaggregated data on violent incidents and contextual vari-
ables [81]. Past research has given empirical support for two competing perspectives:
The first assumes that intermixed group settlement patterns reduce violence, as more
frequent interactions enable rivals to overcome their prejudices towards each other
6Non-stationary time series exhibit non-exponential timing signatures even in the absence of correla-
tions because the CCDF of a mixture of exponential is already heavy-tailed. In any statistical analysis this
non-stationarity thus has to be either explicitly modeled (for instance using parametric methods) or the anal-
ysis has to be restricted to sufficiently small time windows in which the dynamics can be assumed to be
(approximately) stationary.
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Figure 13: Empirical severity and timing signatures of conflict events during the war in Iraq
(2004–2009). The complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of the event
severity in Iraq (A) and Baghdad (B) follow robust power laws (α = 2.48±0.05, x0 = 2,
p < 0.001 and α = 2.57± 0.05, x0 = 2, p < 0.001 respectively). Panels (C) through (E)
show the CCDF of inter event times in a 6 months time window for different periods of the
conflict in Baghdad. In 2006 ad 2007, the timing of events correlates significantly in time,
i.e. the signature of inter-event times (D) significantly deviates from the exponential timing
signature that is characteristic for uncorrelated event timing. In contrast, prior to 2006 (C)
and after 2007 (E) event timing is indistinguishable from that of a random process with
exponentially distributed inter-event times. (F) Shows the number of events per day in
Baghdad for the whole period considered. The black bar indicates where an Anderson-
Darling test rejects the hypothesis of exponential distribution of inter-event times at a 5%
significance level for moving windows of 6 months, i.e. where the event timing signature
is non-trivial. Note that timing analysis was performed for the greater Baghdad area to
avoid spurious timing signatures of unrelated events (see also the discussion in the text).
The data were obtained from the Guardian website [77]; fit lines shown were estimated
using maximum likelihood estimation [78].
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and thus become more tolerant. The other argues that group segregation more effec-
tively reduces violence, given less frequent contact and fewer possibilities for violent
encounters (see Ref. [81] for a detailed overview of the literature supporting the two
perspectives).
The study on Jerusalem now demonstrates that, in fact, both perspectives can
be reconciled, if one acknowledges that the social or cultural distance τ between
groups effectively mitigates the effect of spatial proximity. Spatial proximity, in other
words is necessary but not sufficient to trigger local outbreaks of violence between
members of different groups—only in a situation where tensions between groups are
high a chance encounter on the street would likely trigger a violent outbreak. For-
mally, the study assumes that the probability of any chance encounter to result in
violence depends on an individual’s violence threshold Γ, which changes as a func-
tion of personal exposure to violence (decreases) and the threat of police intervention
(increases). Whether this disposition to engage in violence translates into a violent
incident then is conditional on the social or cultural distance τ , such that the higher
τ , the more likely it is that violence ensues:
p(x) =
(
1+ exp
[−(τ−Γ)
λ
])−1
(12)
Here λ sets the scale of the probability of violence to erupt, the smaller λ the more
abrupt the transition from no violence to violence as a function of τ−Γ.
One can quantitatively show that this local, individual-based mechanism can in-
deed explain a substantial part of the aggregate violence dynamics in Jerusalem [81].
Moreover, considering counter-factual scenarios the model allows to analyze how dif-
ferent levels of segregation corresponding to proposed “futures” for Jerusalem would
affect violence levels in the city. Conceptually, the study highlights the complex inter-
dependence of micro-level conflict processes. In fact, not only the effect of (local)
contact is conditional on socio-cultural distance: conflict (or its absence) in turn also
affects the socio-cultural distances between conflict parties.
One key difficulty in research on the micro-dynamics of conflict is focusing on
the “correct” theoretically and empirically plausible mechanisms that drive violence.
In the study on Jerusalem, for example, one specific mechanism was shown to ac-
count for a significant part of the spatial patterns of violence in the city. This and
similar studies are powerful in the sense that they explicitly test a particular causal
micro-macro-link. Similarly, one may reverse this process and try to infer micro-
processes based on the macro-patterns. Recently, such causal inference designs have
been extended to be applicable to micro-level conflict event data. A novel inferential
technique called Matched Wake Analysis (MWA) [82] estimates the causal effect of
different types of conflict events on the subsequent conflict trajectory. Using sliding
spatial and temporal windows around intervention events guarantees that the choice of
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unit of analysis does not systematically bias inferences, a problem known as the mod-
ifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) [83, 84]. For robust causal inference the method
uses statistical matching [85] on previous conflict trends and geographic covariates.
In order to the estimate average treatment effects for one type of event (treatment) rel-
ative to another one (control) the method uses a Difference-in-Differences regression
design. Formally, it estimates how the number of dependent events after interventions,
npost, changes compared to the number of dependent events prior, npre, as a function
of interventions:7
npost = β0+β1 ·npre+β2 · treatment+u (13)
In this expression β2 is the estimated average treatment effect of the treated, our quan-
tity of interest (see Ref. [82] for further details on the method).
Such inferential methodology is especially useful when testing specific causal hy-
potheses, in particular those that may otherwise be difficult to detect against the back-
ground of large-scale violence unrelated to the hypothesized mechanism. We have
previously emphasized the importance of reactive dynamics for an understanding of
endogenous conflict processes. One such example is the effects of counterinsurgency
measures on the level of insurgent violence. The direction of these effects is generally
disputed, both theoretically and empirically. One line of reasoning suggests that hurt-
ing civilians indiscriminately will generally cause reactive support for the military
adversary [71, 86]. Another line of thinking suggests that the deterrent effect of such
measures leads to less support for the adversary [69, 87].
We use the MWA technique here to directly test this effect empirically by focusing
on the initial insurgency (beginning of 2004 to early 2006) in Iraq. Specifically, we
focus on the greater Baghdad area—the focal area of violence—and consider three
frequent types of events. Raids refer to surprise attacks on homes and compounds, in
which the military suspects insurgents or arms caches. The relative heavy-handedness
and the high probability of disturbing or harming innocent bystanders sets these oper-
ations apart from more selective detentions. In turn, to attack incumbent forces insur-
gents frequently rely on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and civilian support in
manufacturing, transporting, and planting them. If civilians were really more inclined
to support the strategic adversary after having been targeted in raids, one would ex-
pect more IED attacks to take place after and in the spatial vicinity of raids compared
to detentions or arrests under otherwise comparable conditions. The opposite should
be true if deterrence (by raids) was the mechanism at work. As visible in Fig. 14, raids
lead to higher levels of subsequent IED attacks compared to detentions: our estimates
suggest that 2-3 raids, lead to one additional IED attack in the direct spatial vicinity
within up to 10-12 days. This result thus lends empirical support to the notion that
civilians support the adversary in reaction to indiscriminate violence. Based on such
7treatment is a Boolean marking whether the intervention is of the treatment or control type.
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Figure 14: Reactive violence dynamics in Iraq. (A) Map of the greater Baghdad area for
the period 01/2004 to 03/2006 showing the sample of conflict events used in our analysis.
(B) Estimated change in the number of attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
following raids in comparison to those following detentions. After matching on spatial
covariates and trends in IED attacks preceding the interventions, the causal effect of raids
vs. detentions was estimated with a Difference-in-Differences regression design [82]. Note
the noticeable positive effect (lighter colors) in the interpretable (non-shaded) areas of the
plot at distances up to about 3 kilometers and 10-12 days: on average for every 2-3 raids
one more IED attack is observed compared to less heavy-handed interventions. Data used
for this analysis are significant action (SIGACT) military data (see for example Ref. [71]).
improved methodology for studying micro-level processes in conflicts, it is possible
to gain a better and systematic understanding of the driving forces behind violence.
The research discussed in this section highlights that the contributions of com-
plexity science and empirical, case-oriented conflict research to the study of con-
flict are in many ways complimentary. A systemic perspective can serve to identify
abstract general relationships that help shed light on aggregate empirical patterns—
much like statistical physics, which uses the self-averaging properties of large N sys-
tems to study system level properties that emerge from complex microscopic interac-
tions [76]. The in-depth and theory-driven analysis of selected cases in the literature
on micro-dynamics of conflict on the other hands, tries to systematically identify
these detailed micro-level mechanisms. While there has recently been a noticeable
shift towards the study of micro-dynamics of conflict with significant conceptual and
technical progress [79], it is important to note that historically much of the social
science literature on conflict has mainly analyzed aggregate country- or system-level
data.
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The fundamental challenge to date remains bridging the divide between these two
perspectives. In theory, statistical analysis at the level of aggregate distributions can
offer unique systematic insights for the whole ensemble with detailed micro-level
inference revealing the multitude of mechanisms underlying the ensemble properties.
Yet in practice, the two research strands often exist rather disconnected and insights
from one do not enter into the analysis or models of the other. While there may in
principle be a systematic limit to the generalizability of insights from the macro to
the micro level and vice versa, the current situation is clearly a consequence of lack
of engagement with the respective “other” literature.
We are convinced that in light of the increasing availability of detailed conflict
event datasets and the emergence of Big Data on conflicts, complexity science can
make a very substantial contribution to conflict research. Its impact and relevance
will be more substantial the more we tap into the unique insights on both the micro-
and macro-dynamics of conflict the social science literature already has to offer.
3.3 Interstate wars and how to predict them
If conflicts are difficult to stop, then it should be of utmost importance to prevent
their occurrence in the first place. However, any hope of preventing them rests on the
ability to forecast their onset with a certain level of accuracy.
Unfortunately, forecasting conflicts has remained largely elusive to scholars of
international relations. Historical studies of single wars lack out-of-sample predictive
power [88–90]. More systematic approaches focusing on the conditions that tend to
lead to war (e.g., arms races [91], long-standing territorial rivalries [92], or large and
rapid shifts in power [93, 94]) rely on indicators that are coarse in time (typically
yearly), and therefore tend to miss the crucial steps of the escalation of tensions and
the timing of the conflict outbreak [11,95–97]. Efforts at finer-grained codification of
geopolitical tensions are labor-intensive and costly [98, 99] and limited in time [100,
101]. More systematic coding mechanisms using computer algorithms [102,103] also
have a limited time span, as do prediction markets [104, 105]. In addition, event-
based data tend to miss the subtleties of international interactions: on the one hand,
the absence of an event may be as important as its occurrence. Moreover, seemingly
large events need not be cause for alarm whereas small events may greatly matter.
The main obstacle to testing our ability to forecast conflicts, in other words, has been
the lack of measures of tensions that are both fine-grained in time and cover a large
time-span [106–108].
To fill this gap, geopolitical tensions were estimated by analyzing a large dataset
of historical newspaper articles [12]. Google News Archive—the world’s largest
newspaper database with over 60 million pages8—was used to search the text of ev-
8The database spans more than 200 years and includes a uniquely comprehensive set of historical news-
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Figure 15: Estimated probability distribution of the (logged) number of conflict-related
news for all countries and all weeks since 1902. The curve “War within 1 year” refers to
the distribution of conflict-related news for those countries involved in an interstate war
within the next twelve months (i.e., a conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths involving
two or more states).
ery article for mentions of a given country together with a set of keywords typically
associated with tensions (e.g., crisis, conflict, antagonism, clash, contention, discord,
fight, attack, combat).9. A mention of a country together with any of the pre-specified
keywords in a given week resulted in an increased estimated level of tensions for that
country in that week. This procedure was repeated for every week from January 1st
1902 to December 31st 2011, and for every country included in the Correlates of War
dataset [109].
The resulting dataset is a fine-grained and direct proxy for the evolution of ten-
sions in each country, with more than one hundred years of weekly time series for 167
countries. Moreover, by relying on journalists’ perceptions of international tensions,
some of the pitfalls associated with event-data can be avoided, since contemporaries
will process events in view of their respective context and likely consequences, in-
stead of simply classifying them in preexisting categories.
Reports about tensions in the news were found to be significantly higher prior to
wars than otherwise (Fig. 15), which implies that news reports convey valuable in-
formation about the likely onset of a conflict in the future [12]. In fact, reports about
geopolitical tensions typically increase well ahead of the onset of conflict (Fig. 16),
papers.
9E.g.: ‘Sir Edward Grey seeking conference to avert a general conflict. France and Italy agree’ [The
New York Times, 08-28-1914]. See details in Ref. [12].
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Figure 16: Observed number of conflict-related news items prior and after the onset of in-
terstate wars. Each vertical line is a boxplot of the bootstrapped median number of conflict-
related news prior to all interstate wars since 1902. The number of news tends to rise well
ahead of the onset of conflict, and to remain relatively high thereafter, reflecting growing
concerns prior to a conflict and lingering ones after its onset [12].
therefore potentially giving decision-makers ample early warnings to devise and im-
plement a response to help prevent the outbreak.
Even when controlling for a multitude of explanatory variables that have been
identified as relevant in the literature (e.g., regime type, relative power, military ex-
penditure), the sheer number of conflict-related news provides earlier warning signals
for the onset of conflict than existing models. This hypothesis was tested more for-
mally by using only information available at the time (out-of-sample forecasting).
Using such data, the onset of a war within the next few months could be predicted
with up to 85% confidence. Keyword-based predictions significantly improved upon
existing methods. These predictions also worked well before the onset of war—more
than one year prior to interstate wars—giving policy-makers significant additional
warning time [12].
Here we report on an additional finding suggesting the importance of uncertainty
prior to conflict as an early warning signal for war. The outbreak of conflict is rarely
unavoidable. While countries often prepare for potential conflicts well in advance, the
escalation of tensions typically reflects a failed bargaining process, and news articles
mirror this escalation by reporting on these developments. Yet, escalation is rarely
linear, and its outcome remains uncertain until the very end. A negotiated solution
can always be reached before hostilities start. As a result, proximity to the conflict
will probably increase not only observers’ (journalists) worries about the outcome of
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Figure 17: Estimated probability of the onset of interstate war within the next three months.
∆news denotes the weekly change in the number of conflict-related news (i.e., ∆newsi,t ≡
newsi,t/(1+newsi,t−1 for country i and week t), and SD measures the moving standard
deviation of the number of news (divided by the total number of news in the world to
address non-stationarity problems), applying a one-year averaging moving window.
the process, but may also generate diverging opinions and scenarios about the likely
outcome of the process. As a result, we should observe not only an increase over time
in the number of conflict-related news, but also an increase in the variance associated
with these news.
Indeed, we find that the probability of conflict significantly increases as a func-
tion of both the weekly change in the number of conflict-related news items (∆news)
and their standard deviation within a window of one year (Fig. 17). This results goes
beyond [12] and suggests not only that the total number of conflict-related news and
its change over time can be used as early warning signals for war, but also that time-
variability in the number of news could significantly improve upon existing forecast-
ing efforts. This finding is also in line with [110], since increased levels of variabil-
ity can be used as early warning signals for critical transitions in a large number
of physical, biological and socio-economic systems characterized by complexity and
non-linearity (see also [111]).
4 Spreading of diseases and how to respond
In the previous sections, we have seen how crime and conflict can spread in space
and time. We will now address another serious threat, the emergence and worldwide
spread of infectious diseases. Pandemics have plagued mankind since the onset of
civilization. The transition from nomadic hunter-gatherer life styles to settled cul-
tures marked a point in history at which growing human populations, in combination
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Figure 18: Pandemics of the past and present. Global disease proliferation has been
prevalent throughout human history. Before worldwide eradication in 1979, smallpox
had claimed the largest death toll since its emergence approx. 5000 yrs. ago followed
by measles which is believed to have killed a substantial fraction of native Americans in
the times after Columbus. Both, the Justinian Plague and the Black Death were caused by
bacterial diseases and each one killed more than half the European population in a few
years. The 20th century Spanish flu claimed more victims that world war I and HIV/AIDS
is the most recent globally prevalent non-curable infectious disease.
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with increasingly cultured life-stock, led to zoonotic infectious diseases crossing the
intra-species barrier. New pathogens that could be sustained in human populations
evolved, and eventually lead to infectious diseases specific to humans. It is thus no
surprise that the greatest killer among viral diseases, the smallpox virus, emerged
approx. 4000-7000 years ago [112]. It is estimated that smallpox alone has caused
between 300 and 500 million deaths, and along with measles killed up to 90% of the
native American population in the years that followed contact with Europeans in the
15th century. Historic records indicate that various large scale pandemics with devas-
tating consequences swept through Europe in the past two millennia. The Antonine
Plague (smallpox or measles) killed up to 5 million people in ancient Rome and has
been argued to be one of the factors that lead to the destabilization of the Roman
Empire [113], while the Black Death (bubonic plague) swept across the European
continent in the 14th century and erased more than 25% of the European popula-
tion [114]. The largest known pandemic in history, the Spanish flu of 1918-19, caused
an estimated 20-50 million deaths worldwide within a year, more than the casualties
of World War I over the previous 4 years. This pandemic was caused by an influenza
A virus subtype H1N1, a strain similar to the one that triggered the 2009 influenza
pandemic (“swine flu”). Although all of these major events are unique and differ-
ent from each other in many ways, a number of factors are common to all of them.
First, increasing interactions with animal populations in farming increases the likeli-
hood that novel pathogens are introduced to human populations. Second, larger and
denser human populations increase the opportunity for pathogens to evolve the ability
to be sustained in these populations, adapt to the new human host, and trigger local
outbreaks. Third, increasing mobility, for instance driven by trade and commerce,
promotes the spatial distribution of emergent pathogens, and generates the conditions
for full-blown pandemics to follow a local outbreak.
In recent decades, the threat of pandemics has been substantially reduced by a
more advanced medical system, the development of sophisticated antibiotics, antivi-
ral drugs, and vaccination campaigns. The greatest success along these lines is the
worldwide eradication of smallpox in 1979 by a decade-long global vaccination cam-
paign. Today, worldwide health surveillance systems for timely outbreak identifica-
tion are in place, containing emergent infectious disease, and combating endemic
diseases such as polio, tuberculosis, and malaria. However, although advances along
these lines are promising news, modern civilization also contributes to the emergence
of new pandemics. First, intensive animal farming or industrial livestock production
yields a higher rate of intra-species barrier crossing and thus the emergence of po-
tentially virulent human infectious diseases. Second, worldwide population increases
quickly, having recently crossed the 7 billion mark. More than 50% of the Earth’s
population live in dense metropolitan mega cities, thus providing ideal conditions for
an emergent pathogen to be sustained by human-to-human contacts. Third, the mod-
ern world is extremely connected by intense long range traffic. For example, more
35
than three billion passengers travel among four thousand globally distributed airports
every year.
Containing global pandemics is certainly a major concern to ensure stable socio-
economic conditions in the world and anything that can potentially reduce the socio-
economic impact of these events is helpful. In the last decade mathematically parsi-
monious SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) models [115] have been extended suc-
cessfully by including social interaction networks, spatial effects, as well as pub-
lic and private transport, and by more and more fine-grained epidemiological mod-
els [116–121]. One of the most relevant and surprising lessons of such models is that,
in order to minimize the number of casualties and costs of fighting diseases in indus-
trialized countries, it might be economically plausible for them to share vaccine doses
with developing countries, even for free [122]. In this way, the number of infections
can be more effectively contained, particularly in the critical, early stage of disease
spreading.
In the following, we will focus on two aspects. Firstly, a better understanding and
prediction of the spatio-temporal spreading of diseases on a global scale, which per-
mits the development of more effective response strategies. Second, we will address
the issue of information strategies to encourage voluntary vaccination of citizens,
which might be more effective than attempting to enforce compulsory vaccination
through law. In this context, it is useful to remember that each percentage point re-
duction in the number of people falling ill potentially benefits the lives of tens of
thousands of people.
4.1 Modelling disease dynamics
The development of mathematical models in the context of infectious disease dynam-
ics has a long history. In 1766 Daniel Bernoulli published a paper on the effectiveness
of inoculation against smallpox infections [123]. His seminal work not only contained
the first application of the theory of differential equations, but was also published be-
fore it was known that infectious diseases were caused by bacteria or viruses and were
transmissible. The prevalent scientific opinion in Bernoulli’s time was that infectious
diseases were caused by an invisible poisonous vapor, known as the miasma. Evi-
dence existed, however, that inoculation of healthy individuals with degraded small-
pox material incurred immunity to smallpox in some cases. Bernoulli’s theoretical
work shed light on the effectiveness of this procedure, a topic vividly discussed by
the scientific elite of Europe at that time. In the beginning of the 20th century Ker-
mack and McKendrick laid the foundation of mathematical epidemiology in a series
of publications [124, 125] and introduced the SIR (susceptible - infected - recovered)
model which is still used today in most state-of-the-art computational models for the
dynamics of infectious diseases (see also Refs. [126, 127]).
These types of models were designed to describe the time course of epidemics in
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Figure 19: Global connectivity in the 21st century: Heterogeneity and lack of scale.
The network represents the worldwide air-transportation network connecting approx. four
thousand airports worldwide. Symbol size quantifies airport capacity, a proxy for local
population size. Two major characteristics of global connectivity are scale-free connec-
tivity in terms of distance and strong heterogeneity. These factors yield spatio-temporal
complexity of global disease dynamics.
single populations in which every individual is assumed to interact with every other
individual at the same rate. The spatial spread of epidemics was first modeled by
parsimonious reaction diffusion type equations [128] in which the local nonlinear dy-
namics are combined with ordinary diffusion in space. The combination of local, ini-
tially exponential growth typical of disease dynamics, with diffusion in space, generi-
cally yields regular wave fronts and constant spreading speeds. This type of approach
was successfully applied in the context the spread of the Black Death in Europe in
the 14th century [129]. Despite their high level of abstraction, these models provide
a solid intuition and understanding of spreading processes. Their mathematical sim-
plicity allows one to compute how key properties (e.g. spreading speed, arrival times,
and pattern geometry) depend on system parameters [130].
One of the key problems in understanding global disease dynamics in the 21st cen-
tury is that some of the fundamental assumptions in homogeneous reaction-diffusion
models are not valid, not even approximately: (1) the host population is typically
not distributed homogeneously in space and (2) global human mobility is character-
ized by a lack of scale which cannot be accounted for by local diffusion processes.
This is illustrated in Fig. 19 which shows the worldwide air transportation network.
This network connects approx. four thousand airports worldwide and transports more
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than three billion passengers every year. Recent examples have shown that the strong
spatial heterogeneity of the human population in combination with the lack of scale
in global mobility no longer lead to regular wave patterns of global disease spread.
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 initially proliferated in China
but only shortly after its arrival in Hong Kong cases were reported in Canada, the
United States and Europe. In 2009, the H1N1 pandemic started in Mexico, quickly
reached the US and subsequently arrived in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The
spread of modern epidemics is spatially incoherent and chaotic, generically does note
bear any metric regularity, and observed spatio-temporal patterns depend sensitively
on the outbreak location. All these factors complicate the development of predictive
tools that can forecast the time course of emergent infectious diseases.
Despite these challenges, complexity science has produced major advances in
modeling the dynamics of global epidemics. Increasing computer power and the avail-
ability of a new quality of pervasive data, in combination with important theoretical
insights from network science, have enabled scientists to develop highly sophisticated
computational platforms that can simulate large scale pandemics in silico. Modern
super-computers allow running highly detailed agent-based simulations that model
up to almost a billion host individuals, each one with a specific behavioral profile.
State of the art computer models also employ insights that have recently been gained
by analyzing pervasive data obtained in natural experiments on human interactions,
in particular, about human mobility. Smart phones and geo-aware devices have pro-
duced data from which parameters can be extracted that previously had to be assumed
or guessed in models for disease spread.
The most successful computational frameworks for predicting disease dynamics
on a global scale account for multiple factors which are believed to play a role in
a specific context: demographic variation, mobility patterns that include the entire
global air-traffic system as well as the short-scale, daily commuter movements in al-
most every country on the planet, detailed epidemiological data, and disease-specific
mechanisms [116, 117, 119–122].
A large scale operation in this direction is the Global Epidemic and Mobility
(GLEAM) simulation framework [121]. This tool has a client/server architecture that
allows the simulation of global epidemics by accounting for the entire worldwide air-
transportation network in combination with daily commuter traffic in most countries.
The approach accounts for a diverse set of mobility patterns, e.g. bi-directional move-
ments between origin and destination, or different mobility patterns for host individu-
als in different infectious states. Hhospitalization, vaccination, age structure at every
location, and seasonality, can also be incorporated in the model setup (see Fig. 20.
Because of the client/server architecture, a model can be defined on the client, and
the simulation itself can be run on a remote super-computer in little time. A clear
advantage of the GLEAM software is that entire sets of fully stochastic simulations
can be performed in order to compute confidence intervals along with the most prob-
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Figure 20: GLEAM, the global epidemic and mobility simulation software.
The image illustrates the user interface of the interactive simulation software
(http://www.gleamviz.org/). Today, GLEAM represents one of the most sophisticated and
powerful simulation frameworks for global disease dynamics and has been employed in a
variety of contexts.
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able time course. In this respect the design of the GLEAM infrastructure is similar
to modern weather forecast systems. The GLEAM project and related simulation ap-
proaches have become remarkably successful in reproducing observed patterns and
predicting the temporal evolution of ongoing epidemics [131] for instance in predict-
ing the time-course of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Interestingly, many of the predictive, computational models that exist reproduce
similar dynamic features despite significant differences in their underlying assump-
tions and data [132]. Furthermore, the level of detail these models incorporate also
implies an abundance of parameters that either must be assumed, or in some cases
guessed. Generically these parameters interact non-linearly in a given model, and de-
spite their predictive power, it is difficult to assess which parameters are important
and which are less significant. We currently lack a full understanding of the dynamic
richness of these highly detailed models and therefore also of the phenomena they
describe. Another drawback of purely detailed computational approaches is the fact
that parameter values must be chosen and fixed to run a specific computer simulation.
This is particularly challenging when new infectious agents emerge for which none
of the vital disease specific parameters are known. Consequently, at the onset of an
emergent epidemic even the most sophisticated simulation frameworks have to be em-
ployed with great caution because, despite their potential to model the phenomenon in
a very detailed way, a significant level of uncertainty remains concerning the choices
of sensitive parameters.
It also remains unclear, how the multitude of factors shape the dynamics and
how much detail is required to achieve a certain level of predictive fidelity. Most
importantly, detailed computational models that incorporate all potentially relevant
factors ab initio fail to reveal which factors are actually relevant, and which ones are
not [133]. Gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon, however, is particularly
important because based on a deeper understanding we can potentially predict certain
aspects about the most likely time course of a global epidemic, even when a set of
parameters is unknown. Along this line of reasoning, in [14] the authors introduce the
notion of effective distance to replace conventional geographic distance. This move
simplifies the complexity of the spatio-temporal dynamics of global diseases to the
point that even complex network-driven contagion phenomena can be understood in
the framework of ordinary reaction-diffusion dynamics. In other words, when effec-
tive distance replaces geographic distance, spreading phenomena that appear to be
complex in conventional geographic representations possess simple wave fronts and
constant speeds. Thus, the key result of the study was that the observed complex-
ity is predominantly caused by the inappropriate and antiquated use of purely spatial
distance measures.
To best understand the approach, consider a metapopulation network, consisting
of n = 1, ...,M coupled populations, in which local disease dynamics are captured by
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SIR kinetics [115]:
In+Sn
α−→ 2In (14)
In
β−→ Rn (15)
Xm
wnm−−→ Xn, (16)
where Sn, In,Rn denote the states (susceptible, infected, recovered) of an individual in
population n= 1, ....,M. The first reaction represents disease transmission, the second
recovery, and the third equation movement of a host from population m to n (X is a
placeholder for all three classes of individuals, i.e. S, I and R). The parameters of
this system are the population averaged effective per capita transmission rate α , the
population averaged recovery rate β , and the mobility rate wnm. The mobility rate is
given by the per capita traffic flux from m to n, i.e. wnm = Fnm/Nm, where Nm is the
size of population m. The basic reproduction number is defined according to
R0 = α/β , (17)
i.e. the expected number of secondary infections caused by one infected individual in
an entirely susceptible population while it is infectious. The dynamics of the metapop-
ulation SIR model, in the most parsimonious form, are given by
∂tIn = αSnIn/Nn−β In+ ∑
m 6=n
(wnmIm−wmnIn)
∂tSn = −αSnIn/Nn+ ∑
m6=n
(wnmSm−wmnSn) (18)
∂tRn = β In+ ∑
m6=n
(wnmRm−wmnRn)
(recycling the symbols S, I,R for the number of individuals in a given state). Express-
ing the above in terms of fractions of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals
(sn, jn, and rn respectively), the above dynamical system simplifies to
∂t jn = α sn jn−β jn+ γ ∑
m 6=n
Pmn ( jm− jn) ,
∂tsn =−α sn jn+ γ ∑
m6=n
Pmn (sm− sn) , (19)
with rn = 1− sn− jn, see Ref. [14]. The rate parameter γ is the average mobility
rate, i.e. γ =F/N where F = ∑n,m Fnm is the total traffic flux in the network and
N = ∑n Nn the total population in the system. The matrix P with 0≤ Pmn ≤ 1 quan-
tifies the fraction of the travelers with destination m emanating from node n, i.e.
Pmn = Fmn/Fn, where Fn = ∑m Fmn. If we now consider each node in the metapop-
ulation network as the catchment area of each airport in the global mobility network
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and take Fnm as the passenger flux between airports n and m, the above dynamical
system constitutes a structurally simple model for the global spread of an emergent
infectious disease. In fact, the earliest successful models that incorporated worldwide
mobility were structurally similar to Eqs. (19) and most sophisticated models (e.g
the GLEAM simulation framework) possess an underlying mathematical machinery
of similar nature [117, 122, 134, 135]. Essentially the above model has three rate pa-
rameters, α,β and γ . Typical values for influenza-like disease are β ≈ 0.3days−1,
and R0 = α/β ≈ 1.3−2.3. The global mobility parameter is typically much smaller
γ ≈ 0.001−0.02days−1. This implies that mobility has the slowest time-scale of the
system. The complexity of the above model is encapsulated in the flux fraction matrix
elements Pmn which is shaped by the spatial heterogeneity of the metapopulation and
the multiscale properties of the global mobility network. It is this coupling matrix that
causes solutions of the above model to appear spatiotemporally complex, as is shown
in Fig. 21. The figure depicts temporal snapshots of two simulated pandemics (i.e.
solutions to Eqs. (19)) with initial outbreaks in London and Chicago. Because of the
inherent complexity in the global mobility network, i.e. the coupling matrix Pnm, the
patterns appear to be complex, spatially incoherent and quickly lose any correlation
to their initial outbreak location. Clearly, no geographic wave front is discernible ex-
cept in the very beginning of the spreading process. The lack of geographic imprint
makes it difficult to predict arrival time sequences from the maps alone. Furthermore,
the geographic de-correlation makes it impossible to reconstruct the initial outbreak
location based on a single temporal snapshot of the process. Unlike historic spreading
processes that evolved according to more regular wave propagation, modern global
disease dynamics make it difficult to define a proper propagation speed by, for in-
stance, correlating geographic distance with arrival times.
Because the spatio-temporal complexity generated by the model is caused by the
coupling matrix Pnm, a plausible strategy for defining an effective distance measure
must relate this distance to the coupling matrix. A possible choice is the following
definition of an effective, directed length of a link m→ n in the network:
dnm = 1− logPnm > 1
If we interpret the flux fraction Pnm as the conditional probability that an infection
that is present at node m will be passed to n, then the effective length from m→ n is
small if this probability is large, and vice versa. Now consider a multi-leg path Γ =
{n1, . . . ,nL} through the network. Using the above definition, the effective, directed
length of this path is the sum of the effective lengths of each of its legs. This implies
that this length decreases as the probability increases that a path will be followed in
a random walk process with hopping probabilities governed by matrix Pnm. Based on
this, the effective distance Dnm from an arbitrary reference node n to another node m
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Figure 21: Generic dynamic characteristics of global epidemic spread. Each panel depicts
a temporal snapshot of a simulated pandemic that was generated by the metapopulation
model of Eqs. (19). The top row depicts the time course for an initial outbreak in Lon-
don, the bottom row in Chicago. From left to right the panels depict times T = 52, 87
and 122 days since outbreak. Parameters of the simulation were R0 = 1.5, β = 0.28 and
γ = 2.8×10−4. Because of the multi-scale nature of the mobility network and strong spa-
tial heterogeneity the spreading patterns are spatially incoherent, complex and chaotic, no
clear wave front exists from which a spreading speed could be computed, and arrival times
at various places cannot be estimated on geometrical grounds.
in the network is defined by the length of the shortest path from n to m:
Dnm = min
Γ
λ (Γ) (20)
This is equivalent to the assumption that the most probable path dominates, much
like the smallest resistor in an electrical network with parallel conducting lines. From
the perspective of a chosen node n, the set of shortest paths constitutes a shortest
path tree τn, corresponding to the most probable hierarchical sequence of pathways
of an epidemic that originates at a reference node. Fig. 22 illustrates the properties of
effective distance and the shortest path tree from sample reference node Zurich.
The key question is: What are the properties of a simulated pandemic generated
by the metapopulation model of Eqs. (19) in this new, effective representation, when
viewed from the initial outbreak location? This is shown in Fig. 23, which depicts the
same simulation as is shown in Fig. 21, in the shortest path tree representation of each
outbreak location.
We see that the patterns that appeared complicated in the conventional geographic
representation exhibit regular wavefronts in the effective distance representation. Fur-
thermore, these effective waves propagate at constant speeds. Note that this is more
than just a simple remapping of a complex pattern onto a simple one. First, the obser-
vation of the propagating wavefront implies that the original assumption that conta-
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Figure 22: Effective distance in the global mobility network: From the perspective of
Zurich, each other airport has an effective distance derived from the entire worldwide
air transportation network. In the illustration the effective distance is proportional to the
radial distance from the root node ZRH. The underlying tree is the shortest path tree that
reflects the most probable pathway of a contagion process proliferating through the net-
work. Each symbol in the diagram represents one of the airports in the network. Symbol
color quantifies the size of the airport and symbol size the number of branches at a node
in the tree. A few major hubs in the network are labeled by their three letter airport code.
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Figure 23: Regular wave pattern in effective distance. The panels depict the same sim-
ulations as are shown in Fig. 21 except from the effective distance perspective of the
initial outbreak location, i.e. London (top row) and Chicago (bottom row). The pattern
that appears to be complex in the conventional geographic view is mapped onto a regular
wavefront pattern in the effective distance view.
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gion phenomena are dominated by most probable paths was correct. Furthermore, the
remapping only depends on the coupling matrix Pnm in the original nonlinear dynam-
ical system. Because of this, one expects to observe concentric waves irrespective of
the other parameters of the model, e.g. the rate parameters α , β and γ .
The advantages of the effective distance approach become immediately apparent.
Because regular wave propagation is observed in the effective distance view, one can
easily compute arrival times at every node in the network if the effective speed of the
wavefront is known. Also, because the effective distance only depends on the topo-
logical features of the underlying network, we can infer an approximate factorization
of the parameters that determine the arrival time of the epidemic wavefront at any
node in the network:
Ta = De f f (P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
eff. distance
/ve f f (β ,R0,γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
eff. speed
. (21)
The arrival time can be computed by the ratio of effective distance from the outbreak
origin, which only depends on matrix elements Pnm, and the effective speed, which in
turn depends on the rate parameters of the dynamical systems. This implies that, even
if these rate parameters are unknown, one can still estimate the relative arrival times
or the sequence of arrivals of an epidemic, irrespective of disease specific parameters.
For example, given an outbreak at node n0 and denoting the arrival time at any other
node m by Ta(m|n) and the effective distance from n0 to m by De f f (m|n0) we have:
Ta(m|n0)
Ta(n|n0) =
De f f (m|n0)
De f f (n|n0) .
When new pathogens emerge, for instance the recent MERS-CoV (Middle East Res-
piratory Syndrome - Coronavirus), it is typically unknown whether the new agent has
the potential to develop into a full-scale pandemic because: (1) careful measurement
of the relevant disease specific parameters is time consuming, (2) typically trans-
mission pathways are still unknown and must be unravelled, and (3) recovery rates
and other properties and dependencies must me assessed. The effective distance ap-
proach shows that complexity science, and network science in particular, can help
extract properties of a potential spread that are largely robust against variations in
these parameters. Thus universal statements about a potential global spread can be
made. This is very valuable information during the onset of an epidemic since one
can initiate effective containment strategies with minimal information concerning the
disease. Because the approach is so general and is entirely based on the use of a more
appropriate notion of distance in heterogeneous network systems, it is clearly appli-
cable to other types of contagion processes that occur on networks, such as the spread
of news, information or fads in social networks.
Another insight gained by the approach is that one observes concentric wave pat-
terns only from the perspective of the outbreak origin. From the perspective of any
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other node in the network, the dynamic pattern appears more irregular. This can be
quantified and used to reconstruct the outbreak origin for contagion phenomena that
have been spreading but are unnoticed until the incidence passes a certain thresh-
old [136]. Typically these incidence patterns bear no geographic regularity and it is
difficult, albeit essential, to reconstruct the spatial origin in order to develop efficient
containment strategies. The effective distance approach can help reconstruct the out-
break origin by identifying the node from which the observed pattern appears to be
most regular. This approach has successfully reconstructed outbreak origins of re-
cent epidemics, e.g. the foodborne disease EHEC/HUS that struck Germany and its
European neighbors in 2011.
4.2 Enabling more effective disease control using social in-
formation systems
Vaccine-preventable diseases can be eradicated from a population when enough in-
dividuals immunize. Unfortunately, enforcing compulsory vaccination is challeng-
ing and potentially incompatible with personal liberties [137–139]. Beyond ethical
and political concerns, the efficacy of compulsory vaccination programs may be con-
strained by (1) the limited information available to those designing the policies, and
(2) uncertainty about how people will change their behavior [140] in response to the
information they receive as an epidemic progresses. Here we will investigate when
voluntary vaccination [141, 142] can be a viable alternative to imposing immuniza-
tion in a top-down way. That is, we use a model to determine if and when information
about the risk of becoming ill will enable individuals to voluntarily make decisions
that are beneficial, not only to their own health, but also to the health of many others.
To model vaccination we consider the SIR model (see Sec. 4.1) with demography
and assume that a fraction p of individuals vaccinates at birth (see Fig. 24A). Com-
monly, p is taken to be a constant. In a population where contact occurs at random
between any pair of individuals (known as the well-mixed assumption) the dynamics
of this model are described by the following system of ordinary differential equations
(which are exact in the limit of infinite population size N):
∂ts =−αs j−µs+µ(1− p)
∂t j = αs j−β j−µ j (22)
∂tr = β j−µr
∂tv =−µv+µ p ,
where s, j, r and v are the fraction of individuals that are respectively susceptible,
infected, recovered and vaccinated. We assume that the population size is approxi-
mately constant, and therefore the natural birth and death rate are both given by µ .
47
Figure 24: The vaccination model in a well-mixed population. (A) The individuals in the
population can be in one of four states: Susceptible, Infected, Recovered or Vaccinated.
Individuals enter/exit the population at the birth/death rate µ . At birth individuals are sus-
ceptible unless they vaccinate, which happens with probability p. Susceptibles become
infected through contact with infecteds at contact rate α . Infecteds recover with recovery
rate β . (B) The intersection of the j∗ and Pv( j∗) curves gives the steady-state infection in
the system. As c= ci/cv increases, j∗ decreases, but remains non-zero for finite c, indicat-
ing that disease cannot be eradicated for ci finite and cv > 0.
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The contact rate between individuals is α , and β the recovery rate. (The fractions
denoting the state of the system are a function of time although we do not explicitly
show this dependence.) Setting the time derivatives to zero we can easily determine
the steady-state infection level j∗ as a function of p:
j∗ =
µ(1− p)
β +µ
− µ
α
. (23)
This implies that the disease will die out when the vaccinated fraction of individuals
is p > 1− (γ+µ)/α (see e.g. [143] for a more detailed derivation).
To model voluntary vaccination we modify this standard model so that the fraction
of individuals who vaccinate is a function of the fraction of infected individuals rather
than a constant. This captures the idea that individuals will perceive a greater risk of
becoming ill when they see higher disease incidence around them, and are therefore
more likely to vaccinate [140]. More specifically, following prior models [141] and
experimental evidence [144], we assume that individuals make rational choices. In
this framework an individual who vaccinates will incur a cost cv (the cost of vacci-
nation) and one that becomes ill will incur the cost of infection ci (we assume that
vaccines have 100% efficacy and thus vaccinated individuals will never become in-
fected, but this assumption can be easily relaxed). Therefore, the expected cost to an
individual who vaccinates is cv. Meanwhile, the expected cost to an individual who
does not vaccinate is ciR, where R is an individual’s estimate of the probability that
she will fall ill if she does not vaccinate. We further assume that R is simply estimated
to be the fraction of infected others she sees; thus R = j in a well-mixed model.
A rational individual will choose to vaccinate if this action minimizes the cost she
expects to incur. Let Pv be a Boolean variable that indicates whether an individual
vaccinates (Pv = 1 denotes vaccination). Then an individual’s choice will follow the
threshold rule:
Pv =
{
1 if cR≤ 1
0 if cR > 1 ,
(24)
where c = ci/cv is the perceived relative cost of infection. We will approximate this
step function by the continuous function
Pv(R;c,ω) =
(cR)ω
(cR)ω +1
. (25)
This function is more general than the sharp threshold in Eq. (24) because the smooth-
ness incorporates small variation in the vaccination threshold of a single individual
(due to e.g. individual error) and also variation across the thresholds of different indi-
viduals. (In the limit ω→ ∞ we recover the discontinuous threshold rule; here we fix
ω at the intermediate value ω = 8.)
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To approximate the well-mixed dynamics in a system where individuals make
vaccination choices according to rule (24), we use Eq. (22) with p = Pv. Thus, the
steady-state infection level j∗ is given by Eq. (23), represented graphically by the
intersection of the curves in Fig. 24B. The crucial insight to draw from this solution is
that, as long as there is any cost associated with vaccination, there will be insufficient
vaccination to eradicate a disease. A similar result, echoing the troubling conclusion
that voluntary vaccination is not a viable alternative to enforced immunization, was
derived through a game-theoretic argument in [141].
The prior result relies on the assumption that the spread of disease, and the infor-
mation available to individuals about this spread, are highly homogeneous throughout
the population. However, as discussed in Sec. 4.1, the complex contact patterns be-
tween individuals, which mediate the spread of diseases in the real world, lead to
spatio-temporal variation in infection levels. Therefore, we ask how the effectiveness
of voluntary vaccination changes when individuals make immunization choices using
information that incorporates this variability. To answer this question we introduce
a model where individuals interact physically only with a subset of the population,
which we call contact neighbors. We employ the formalism of a network [149] to
represent this contact structure [146–148]. Each individual is represented by a node,
and the links between nodes represent the potential for an infectious interaction. To
model variation in the information that individuals have about the health of others,
we introduce a second network where individuals are connected if they are informed
about each other’s state. (The transmission of information could be through any mech-
anism: e.g. through direct conversation, word of mouth, observation of symptoms,
mass-media reporting, or social media.) The information neighborhood can be (1) a
subset of the contact network, (2) exactly equal to it, or (3) a superset (see Fig. 25).
By construction, all individuals have the same number of contact neighbors k and the
same number of information neighbors kinfo. However, we allow for the number of
contact neighbors to differ from the number of information neighbors. The key point
is that, in this setting, an individual estimates the risk of infection R from the fraction
of its infected information neighbors (rather than considering the global fraction of
infected individuals as above). For both of these networks we consider two types of
topologies: (1) a network where every node has the same predetermined number of
neighbors but otherwise has a random structure, and (2) a lattice network (for descrip-
tion of these two types of networks see a standard network reference, e.g. Ref. [149]).
These two simple network topologies are different enough to demonstrate that the
results we find are not due to specific structural features.
To investigate the effect that the information range has on the effectiveness of
voluntary vaccination, we simulate an individual-level model of this system and vary
the size of the information neighborhood kinfo. The contact neighborhood k is small
and fixed (we set k = 12, but the behavior is similar for neighborhoods up to an or-
der larger). To estimate the probability that vaccination will remove the disease from
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Figure 25: The right information range facilitates disease eradication. Probability F that
the disease is eradicated after a fixed time T , as a function of kinfo/N, the fraction of the
total population within an individual’s information neighborhood (here N = 104 agents).
The main figure is for a lattice network while the inset shows a random network, both with
a contact neighborhood of size k = 12. An individual interacts with others in her contact
neighborhood (red) and sees the state of those in her information neighborhood (blue).
The overlapping area is shown in violet. The information neighborhood is a subset of the
contact neighborhood when k> kinfo, exactly the same when k= kinfo, and a superset when
k < kinfo.
the population, we fix a time T much larger than the transient time, and count the
number of simulations where j(T ) = 0. We find that this fraction F of simulations
where the disease is eradicated changes systematically with kinfo (see Fig. 24). In-
terestingly, F exhibits a clear maximum when the information neighborhood is of
an intermediate size. Access to information about a growing number of neighbors
initially facilitates eradication of the disease. However, as individuals average over
information obtained from increasingly large regions of the system, the disease be-
comes decreasingly likely to die out. Further experiments indicate that this qualitative
behavior holds across different epidemiological parameters that allow the infection to
invade the population when there is no vaccination10, although the mechanisms driv-
ing the behavior vary [145].
In summary, although an epidemic cannot be contained by voluntary immuniza-
10The condition for a disease to invade the population is that α/(β + µ) > 1 [124]. This is one of the
most established results in mathematical epidemiology.
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tion when individuals use average global information, the successful eradication of
a disease can occur for an intermediate range of information that is neither local
nor global. In this range individuals make their vaccination decisions taking into
account variability in infection densities. This suggests a promising alternative to
top-down vaccination policies: empowerment of people through information systems
such as social media, thereby allowing them to take responsible decisions to immu-
nize themselves. Importantly, given the right information range, individual choices
will be aligned with socially desirable outcomes.
5 Summary, conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we have discussed recent work on crowd disasters, crime, terrorism,
war, and the spread of disease from the perspective of complexity science. We have
pointed out that many counter-intuitive system behaviors are due to the existence
of non-linear amplification, feedback, and cascade effects. Many of the surprising
effects discussed here result from correlations between dynamical processes that in-
validate the common representative agent or mean-field approach, which is based on
the assumption of well-mixed interactions. This has important policy implications,
namely that conventional approaches to address the above problems can potentially
deteriorate the situation, while their mitigation requires a different perspective and
a new approach. Therefore, old problems can be addressed more successfully when
applying a complex systems perspective.
We have pointed out that the classical rational choice approach suggests that prob-
lems such as crime or terrorism should be effectively suppressed by strong enough de-
terrence. In contrast to these expectations, however, one finds crime cycles, escalation
and recurrence of conflicts. The reason for this is that the equilibrium or representa-
tive agent approaches underlying classical rational choice analysis are not always
applicable [15]. The social systems investigated here are characterized by systemic
instabilities. Under such conditions, the desirable system state is left sooner or later,
often giving rise to cascade effects such as contagious spatio-temporal spreading.11
As a result, the system is eventually driven out of control, despite everybody’s best
intentions and efforts to avoid this.
Today’s prevalent focus on individuals, their behavior and how to control it, ig-
nores the importance of systemic effects. For example, recent reports have cast se-
rious doubt on the effectiveness of deterrence strategies.12 Calls for more or longer
11Bankruptcy cascades [150] are a good example for this.
12A recent report on CIA practices calls the effectiveness of “harsh interrogation” techniques into ques-
tion (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/31/senate-torture-report n 5061921.html, accessed Apr. 16,
2014), and an independent US panel recently concluded that mass surveillance of phone data has been
ineffective in detecting terrorist threats (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-25856570, accessed
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prison sentences and extended surveillance stress that current punitive approaches are
not working well. Despite the best intentions, “more of the same” is very unlikely to
have positive effects if we do not understand why such measures have been of limited
effect in the past. One of the key problems in this regard appears to be the individual-
centric approach, which often systematically neglects the collective dynamics, i.e. the
complex systemic interplay of individual actions and the broader social context they
take place in as well as the socio-economic conditions of an individual.
More successful approaches for averting system dynamics that endanger human
lives need to move from an individual-centered to a systemic perspective. For exam-
ple, harmful cascade effects resulting from systemic instabilities and related loss of
control may be countered by suitable system designs with engineered breaking points
or adaptive decoupling strategies such as separation or immunization [15]:
1. For example, when the density is so high that there are involuntary body con-
tacts between many people, crowd disasters are quite likely. Under such condi-
tions, forces are transferred between the bodies of people. They may push them
around in a phenomenon called “crowd turbulence”, such that some individuals
may stumble. If someone is falling to the ground, a domino effect is likely to
cause many people to fall over each other. As a consequence, the people on the
ground may suffocate. To avoid this, evacuation (pressure relief strategies) are
required early on, to avoid densities under which forces may be transmitted be-
tween bodies. In other words, low enough densities will avoid cascade effects.
One possible way of reaching this is the use of apps that provide re-routing
recommendations to visitors of mass events.
2. We have also seen that crime may spread by imitation of successful neighbors.
In our model, we have studied the effect of peer punishment (which also un-
derlies the establishment of social norms). Surprisingly, crime cannot be elim-
inated by more deterrence and high discovery rates. The reason is that (most)
people are not criminal by nature. Their behavior rather depends on the be-
haviors of their neighbors in the social interaction network. Hence, improving
socio-economic conditions may be more effective than sending many people to
prison.
3. Furthermore, deterrence may not only fail to stop terrorism but, on the con-
trary, may lead to more attacks. We showed that unspecific interventions caus-
ing harm to civilians tend to undermine the legitimacy of the “war on terror”,
which may instead increase civilian support for the cause of “freedom fight-
ers”. This, in turn, can ultimately lead to escalation instead of the intended
de-escalation of violence.
Jan. 24, 2014). Recent violent clashes in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, have cast doubt on the effectiveness of mas-
sive police interventions in pacifying the city’s favelas (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/rio-
deadly-clashes-death-of-dancer, accessed April 24, 2014).
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4. In the context of the conflict in Jerusalem we discussed the effect of socio-
cultural distance between different population groups on levels of violence. De-
terrence or policing alone does not appear to be sufficient to deter violence be-
tween the various factions in the city. If the socio-cultural distance between the
groups is too large, encounters in daily life may spark violent confrontations.
Given large socio-cultural distances that can not easily be changed, an alterna-
tive and more effective strategy may be to limit the contact between groups and,
thus, reduce the number of possible triggers and interrupt cascade effects.
5. A complementary approach to reducing violence is to predict the onset of con-
flict before it actually occurs. We discussed a methodology based on the anal-
ysis of large news archives to detect growing tensions that are indicative of
potential escalations. In line with findings in complex biological and natural
systems, early warnings signals for critical transitions can be found not only by
direct measurement of the phenomenon—an increase in the number of conflict-
related news prior to conflict—but also by other attributes of the time series,
such as changes in variance over time. Based on such signals, international po-
litical, social, or economic efforts may be made to reduce upcoming tensions
and thereby thwart confrontations and war.
6. Cascade effects do not only promote crowd disasters, crime and violence. They
are also the basis of the epidemic spreading of diseases. We have presented
an effective distance measure that can serve to understand the spatio-temporal
infection dynamics, to identify the origin location of a disease, and to predict
its further spreading. Thereby, the model can help to use limited immunization
doses in a better way to contain pandemics more effectively. In order to reach
the best possible immunization, well-adapted decentralized information strate-
gies, e.g. through social media, promise to be most effective.
The above insights can contribute to saving human lives by promoting approaches
that differ markedly from commonly applied strategies. In particular, the findings dis-
cussed in our paper suggest that too strict control attempts may actually cause a loss of
control in a complex system. The reason is that strong control may not only be expen-
sive, but also ineffective, as it tends to undermine the natural capability of complex
systems to self-organize.13 To control a complex system, a “long leash”, i.e. allowing
13In some sense, strong control may inhibit the normal functionality of a complex system. An example for
the failure of top-down control is the fact that even the most sophisticated technological control mechanisms
increase flight safety less efficiently than a non-hierarchical culture of collaboration in the cockpit where co-
pilots are encouraged to question the decisions and actions of the pilot [151]. Moreover, the official report
on the Fukushima disaster [152] stresses that it was not primarily the earthquake and tsunami which was
responsible for the nuclear meltdowns, but “our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority;
our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism.”—in other words, too much top-down control.
Similar problems are likely to arise from the application of mass surveillance, as it is likely to cause self-
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for some flexibility (“freedom”) often works better than a “short leash”.14 A promis-
ing approach along these lines is the principle of “guided self-organization” [15,154],
i.e. to interfere with the system in a minimally invasive way, such that the system self-
organizes and does by itself what we want it to do. In this context, it is worth remind-
ing the reader of the “minimally invasive” principle of “chaos control”, which just
pushes the system slightly, at the right moment, to let it take a particular path [155].
Planning and control approaches mostly work well for stationary systems, while
complex systems with extremely variable and hardly predictable dynamics call for
enough autonomy to flexibly adapt to the respective local requirements [156]. In
other words: managing complexity requires decentralized adaptation rather than
centralized control. Nevertheless, it is possible (and even necessary) to enable the
self-organization of complex systems [157]. Suitable institutional settings, such as
proper organizational frameworks for mass events, can support systems in their self-
organization and self-regulation, thereby reducing the need for interference. This
means replacing (or complementing) the classical concept of planning and top down
control with the concept of empowerment, i.e. creating opportunities for individu-
als to make desirable decisions rather than to enforce a particular way of reaching
a goal [158, 159]. In fact, to be manageable, complex systems must be designed in
such a way that the interactions and institutional framework jointly enable favorable
self-organization.
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